University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Great Plains Quarterly

Great Plains Studies, Center for

Winter 2010

"This Must Have Been a Grand Sight": George Bent
and the Battle of Platte Bridge
Steven C. Haack
Lincoln, Nebraska

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/greatplainsquarterly
Part of the Indigenous Studies Commons, Other American Studies Commons, and the United
States History Commons
Haack, Steven C., ""This Must Have Been a Grand Sight": George Bent and the Battle of Platte Bridge" (2010). Great Plains Quarterly.
2521.
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/greatplainsquarterly/2521

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Great Plains Studies, Center for at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Great Plains Quarterly by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

"THIS MUST HAVE BEEN A GRAND SIGHT"
GEORGE BENT AND THE BATTLE OF PLATTE BRIDGE

STEVEN C. HAACK

The Battle of Platte Bridge, July 26, 1865, is a
noteworthy event in the annals of the American Indian Wars. An alliance of Cheyenne,
Sioux, and Arapahoe, numbering in excess of
2,000 warriors, traveled three days to a specific
military objective, an undertaking unusual
both in terms of its magnitude and its level
of organization. The battle is also of interest
because we have a detailed description of the
event written from the Native American viewpoint. This description comes in the form of a
number of letters written to George Hyde by
Southern Cheyenne George Bent.
George Bent, son of the famous trader
William Bent and Owl Woman, a Southern
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Cheyenne, was educated in white schools in
Westport, Missouri, and St. Louis. Injured at
the Sand Creek Massacre, he joined the hostile
forces that traveled north in the spring of 1865
to ally themselves with the Native Americans
in the Powder River region. Bent joined the
raiding parties that came down to the North
Platte in May and June and was a participant
in the Battle of Platte Bridge and the Battle of
Red Buttes, both of which took place on July
26, 1865. Bent went on to serve as a translator
and government liaison to the Cheyenne for
decades on the reservation in Oklahoma. l
Bent established relations with a number
of historians and ethnographers, most notably
George Bird Grinnell. Although productive,
these relationships frequently proved frustrating for both parties. Bent often felt that the
researchers worked in a piecemeal way, were
not deferential to the elders with whom he
had arranged interviews, and failed to publish
the information they acquired in a timely
manner. 2 As he watched the elders around him
age and die, he was acutely aware that the history, wisdom, and lore of the Cheyenne people
were vanishing. It was his desire that a book
be produced preserving all that he and others
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could remember about his people. In 1904 Bent
began a correspondence with George Hyde,
an independent scholar in Omaha, Nebraska.
From 1905 until his death in 1918, Bent wrote
over 300 letters to Hyde. Hyde completed the
manuscript shortly before Bent's death but was
unable to find a publisher for it. He eventually
sold the manuscript and a number of the letters
to the Denver Public Library. His manuscript
was rediscovered in 1966 and the book was
finally published in 1968. 3
Hyde was particularly interested in the
geographic locations mentioned by Bent,
especially those along the Arkansas River in
Colorado and Kansas and the watershed of
western Kansas. Bent would occasionally draw
maps to illustrate his narrations, but Hyde
would also prepare maps, some quite detailed,
and mail them to Bent, requesting that particular trails or encampments be marked and
the map returned. Bent was generally accommodating in this regard, though Hyde's notes
occasionally express frustration over Bent's
lack of cooperation. It appears that in the
course of writing his book, Hyde separated the
maps from their corresponding letters, and in
most cases, they were never reunited.
Eight of the letters Bent wrote to Hyde
mention the Battle of Platte Bridge, and three
of them have long, detailed descriptions of the
preparations for the battle, the journey to the
area, and the battle itself. In addition, two of
the letters, dated May 22, 1906, and November
10, 1915, refer to maps that apparently accompanied those letters. The 1906 letter is now
held in the Coe Collection at Yale University,
which in fact holds the bulk of Bent's letters. The 1915 letter is held in the Western
Americana Collection at the Denver Public
Library. Neither of these archives, however, has
the maps, which are held in the archives of the
University of Colorado at Boulder Libraries. 4
These maps are among fourteen acquired in
1928 from John Van Male, a Denver book
dealer who had purchased them from Hyde. 5
Terrain is always a major factor in any military confrontation, and the battles of July 26,
1865, are no exception. The dominant feature

of the area was the North Platte River, a wide,
braided river with deep channels and a broad
floodplain in which the channels wandered.
When the water ran high, the river constituted
a barrier that wagons could cross only by bridge.
At other times, it could be readily crossed at
a number of fords. The sandy soil around the
river was easily eroded, and the many ravines
leading to the river were quite deep, with steep
sides. These ravines and the vegetation that
grew in them provided good cover for combatants. Bluffs and mesas are common in the
area and provide high ground from which the
surrounding area is visible for many miles. The
high ground may seem to be the ideal location
for a military installation, but in the arid environment of the High Plains, the availability
of water is more important than the tactical
advantage of elevation. Platte Bridge Station
was located in a loop of the river. The terrain
was open to the south and east. A tributary
enters the river from the northwest about a
mile downstream from Platte Bridge Station.
Known by the soldiers as Dry Creek, it is now
known as Casper Creek.
What follows is a description and explication of the Battle of Platte Bridge as it was
presented in the letters of George Bent. I also
examine one map he created of the battlefield,
as well as another map drawn by George Hyde
and annotated by Bent. Additionally, a comparison of these maps to a contemporary topological map of the area is introduced to help in
our understanding of Bent.
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

In large part, the motivation for the attack
at Platte Bridge Station lay far to the south
on the plains of western Kansas and eastern
Colorado. The government's relationship with
the Native Americans throughout the Great
Plains had been in a state of deterioration since
the early 1860s. The settlements and emigrant
trains had depleted many of the resources
upon which the Native population depended.
August of 1864 saw an explosion of violence
against white settlers, starting on the Little
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FIG. 1. Map of Wyoming showing current day cities Casper and Cheyenne in relation to the North Platte River,
Platte Bridge Station, and Ft. Caspar. Based on the map, "Indian Battles and Skirmishes, 1854-1876," in State
Maps on File, Mountain & Prairie, Wyoming, 8.17, by Facts On File Publishing, New York, NY, 1984. Used by
permission. Map is not to scale.

Blue River in south-central Nebraska and
spreading out along the Overland Trail. The
escalating pattern of raids and reprisals came to
a head in late November of 1864 with the Sand
Creek Massacre, when Col. John Chivington
led an attack of Colorado Volunteers on an
encampment of Arapahoe and Southern
Cheyenne Indians. Some 200 were killed,
mostly women, children, and the elderly. In
response, large numbers of Arapahoe, Sioux,
and Cheyenne came together and headed
north, raiding ranches, outposts, and emigrant
trains as they went. In early February the army
post at Julesburg was attacked. Soldiers were led
by decoys into an ambush and eighteen were
killed. Raiding at the ranches and along the

road resulted in the closing of the Overland
Trail to all but heavily escorted traffic. 6
After confronting the party at Mud Springs
and Rush Creek in early February, William
Collins estimated the force to consist of
between 2,000 and 3,000 warriors and their
camp at 800 to 1,000 lodges. He was prescient
in his warning that these Indians would join
their brethren in the Powder River area and
organize attacks on the traffic and installations
along the North Platte River:
They are well armed and mounted; have
many rifled muskets and plenty of ammunition, including minie cartridges with ounce
balls; are full of venom and bent on revenge
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for the loss of their people south. So soon
as they reach the Indians north they will
excite and perhaps compel them to become
hostile. The posts on the Platte, especially
Deer Creek and Platte Bridge, which are
within 100 miles of Powder river, will be in
immediate danger. 7
In response to Collins's warning, the stations
along the North Platte River, spaced at intervals of about fifty miles, were improved with the
addition of stockades and facilities adequate to
accommodate about one hundred soldiers.
Other plans were in the offing as well. In
February, Brig. Gen. Patrick Connor was put
in charge of the newly created District of the
Plains. He immediately began organizing a
punitive expedition into the Powder River
Basin. On March 29, Maj. Gen. Grenville M.
Dodge, commander of the District of Missouri,
wired Connor that he had 2,000 mounted
men en route: "I want this force pushed right
on after the Indians." In a second wire sent
on the same day he states, "With the force at
your disposal you can make vigorous war upon
the Indians and punish them so that they will
be forced to keep the peace." Dodge went on
to outline a plan to construct and provision
depots and recruit manpower from the ranks of
Confederate prisoners. 8 The plan was to strike
before the grass grew, catching the enemy
before their war ponies recovered from the
rigors of the High Plains winter.
Thus, as spring stretched toward summer,
both sides were expecting a major confrontation-one that would, depending upon the side
consulted, either strike a blow of vengeance for
Sand Creek and keep the white man out of the
Native Americans' last stronghold, or punish
the Indians for their years of depredations and
force them to accommodate westward expansion. Both sides were planning. The army set
to work utilizing a complex system involving centralized production, supply lines, and
troop movements. This system had already
been stretched to its limits by the Civil War.
Horses and equipment were in short supply and
soldiers were clamoring to be mustered out of

service. The Native Americans, unencumbered
by such concerns, got in the first shot.
PLATTE BRIDGE STATION

The bridge that would become the focus
of the Indians' summer campaign was a very
impressive structure. Built in 1859 at the
location of present-day Casper, Wyoming, it
was about 1,000 feet long. Spanning across
twenty-eight log cribs, it served as a toll bridge
for wagons on the Oregon Trail. Several rude
buildings had stood at its southern end since
its construction, serving the needs of telegraph operators and Pony Express personnel,
but in the spring of 1865, construction was
commenced on improvements. The accommodations would eventually include a laundry,
a blacksmith shop, officers' quarters, squad
rooms, storehouses, and a kitchen. A small
stockade, measuring forty-five feet square, was
bordered by structures on the north, stables on
the west, and a nine-foot-high palisade to the
east and south?
The Kansas Eleventh Cavalry was ordered
to report to Fort Laramie in February. Starting
from Fort Riley, they commenced upon a
miserable trek through winter storms via
Fort Kearney and Julesburg, arriving at Fort
Laramie on April 19. Most of the men were
inadequately clothed for such a journey, and a
third of them had no horses. Half the companies were sent south to Fort Halleck while the
rest were distributed among the stations along
the North Platte. The Kansas Eleventh set up
headquarters a few miles south of the bridge
at the base of what is now Casper Mountain,
the northern terminus of the Laramie range.
This site, named Camp Dodge, would serve as
headquarters for several months. Timber was
hauled from the mountain for the construction
of the improvements at the bridge. The Kansas
Eleventh moved into their new accommodations in early July. Most of the men had signed
up for a three-year enlistment in August of
1862, so their period of enlistment was nearing
its end. They were informed on July 15 that
they would be returning to Kansas as soon
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as they were relieved by the Michigan Sixth
Cavalry.lO
The soldiers stationed on the North Platte
were bedeviled by undependable supply lines,
inadequate rations, and poor mounts. The task
of patrolling and repairing the telegraph line
was frustrating. Their horses were no match for
the sturdy Indian ponies and would often give
out under the stress of a chase. The Indians had
come to understand the strategic importance of
the telegraph lines and could easily tear out a
few hundred yards of it while passing through
the area. Sometimes they would break the line
at a point where the surrounding terrain facilitated an ambush, and there they would wait
for the repair crew. The soldiers learned that it
was necessary to travel in groups of twenty or
more'!!
The war party that arrived in the vicinity
of Platte Bridge on the morning of July 25 did
a masterful job of concealing its true size. The
soldiers at the bridge had been confronted a
number of times by raiding parties consisting of
a few dozen to a few hundred warriors, and the
initial confrontation appeared to fit this pattern. The morning started with routine duties.
John Crumb and two others were tending the
horse herd. According to Crumb,
I with two other of the boys had taken our
herd of horses across the bridge to the north
to graze. There was a nice little bottom covered with good grass extending down to the
mouth of Casper Creek. We were well down
to the lower end of this bottom when the
boy I had out on picket on a high hill east
of the creek fired three shots, our danger
signal. He could see well nigh the whole
length of the creek. We got the horses well
started for the bridge when I sent the other
boy down to the water's edge, opposite camp
to fire the signal, as the wind was blowing
very strong from the south, and I didn't
think they could hear the first signal. That
brought the boys out, they met us on the
bridge and secured their horses.
In the meantime, Indians rushed out of
Casper Creek and swarmed up the bottom,

7

but we had the horses all on the bridge as
they rushed past. They didn't even exchange
shots with us as they rushed by not more
than twenty-five yards from us three that
were driving the herd.
Thus began an unsuccessful decoy operation.
The Indians were less interested in the herd
than they were in baiting the soldiers into pursuing them five miles to the northwest where
the main body of warriors awaited. Crumb
continues:
The whole company scattered out over the
hills, two to a dozen in a place and followed
the Indians back well onto the hills until
it looked as though there were Indians
enough to eat us all up, but they don't like
a man on foot with a carbine in his hands.
The Captain had the recall sounded and we
returned to camp, followed by the Indians at
long range.!2
Crazy Head, a Cheyenne participant, noted
in a statement to Grinnell that the better part
of the day was spent attempting to lure the
soldiers out, to no avail, until the chiefs sent
High Back Wolf out to order them to return
to camp.13 At that point, a number of warriors,
including High Back Wolf, crossed the river
near the mouth of Casper Creek to raid the station's beef herd. A detail of about thirty soldiers
rushed out to the herd and drove the Indians
back, killing High Back Wolf in the process.
The commander at the station, Maj. Martin
Anderson, spurred by these disturbing events,
took an inventory of the situation. About
ninety able-bodied men were on duty with
twenty rounds of ammunition available for
each rifle.!4 The telegraph line to the east was
down. He had no idea, of course, of the mass of
warriors behind the hill six miles to the north.
The typical complement of men at the station was just over one hundred, but two dozen
members of the Kansas Eleventh Cavalry were
absent, having left on the morning of July 22 to
escort a contingent of Ohio soldiers fifty miles
up the road to the Sweetwater Station. This
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detail, led by Sgt. Amos Custard, had started
the return trip with three empty wagons on the
morning of the 25th, and at about the time of
the skirmish at the herd, they were preparing
to stay the night at Willow Springs, midway
between Sweetwater and Platte Bridge. IS
At about two o'clock the next morning, a
contingent of Ohio men arrived on horseback
from Sweetwater Station. Major Anderson
was awakened and was urged to send an
escort to the west to locate the wagon train
and bring it back to the station under cover
of darkness. Despite the warning signals of
the previous day, Anderson said it could wait
until morning. Thus it was that two dozen
men saddled up shortly after sunrise and,
under the command of Lt. Caspar Collins,
crossed the bridge and headed up the road to
the west. As they were preparing to leave, Lt.
George Walker stood atop a building at the
station and saw that Indians were concealed
along the riverbank to the west of the station
and also in the vicinity of Casper Creek. He
alerted Major Anderson, who ordered more
men to cross the bridge on foot to hold the
northern end in the event the detail was
attacked and had to return. 16 Soon after crossing the bridge, Collins took his party north of
the road, traveling along a ridge from which
he had a good view of the surrounding terrain.
When the detail was about a mile from the
bridgehead, the Indians attacked. All witness
accounts express astonishment at the number
of warriors coming out of every ravine and
from behind every hillock. Collins wheeled
his men around and headed back to the bridge
through a crush of warriors. Simultaneously,
hundreds of warriors poured out of Casper
Creek and rushed the men at the bridgehead.
The soldiers repelled these attackers and held
the bridgehead long enough for the detail to
return. Twenty members of the Collins party
managed to regain the bridge, most suffering
injuries. Five were killed, including Caspar
CollinsP
The men at the station, finally aware of
the magnitude of the force they faced, set to
work securing their position as best they could.

Before long the wagon train from Sweetwater
Station was sighted descending through a
gap between hills five miles to the west. The
Indians perceived the train at the same time
and made a headlong rush in its direction.
The ensuing fight would become known as the
Battle of Red Buttes, though the geological
feature of that name actually lies six miles to
the west of the battlefield.
The initial attack at the wagon train was
certainly chaotic. It appears that the soldiers
stopped their wagons and attempted to form
a skirmish line before the leading edge of the
attacking force struck them. According to
Crazy Head's statement, "American Horse says
that when they got near soldiers, these tried to
fall in line, but their hearts seemed to fail them
and they ran back to the wagons which were
close behind. They tried to corral the wagons
but there was not time and they halted the
wagons in line."18 Five soldiers were cut off from
the main body and escaped down a ravine and
across the North Platte River. On the south
bank of the river, one of these men killed Left
Hand, brother of the famous warrior Roman
Nose. Two of the soldiers who escaped across
the river were killed, but the other three managed to work their way back to the station. One
of them, James Shrader of Company D, would
travel to Casper from his home in Oskaloosa,
Kansas, some sixty years later to help local
historian Robert S. Ellison reconstruct the
battle. 19
While most of the Indians were at the wagon
train, Major Anderson ordered a detail to find
and repair the break in the telegraph line to
the east. Bent was with the Indian forces at the
wagon train at this time and makes no mention
of this sortie, which was ultimately unsuccessful. However, a description of the effort illustrates the difficulties imposed by the terrain
along the river. Figure 2 is a reproduction of
a map that accompanied an article published
in 1918 by Lt. George M. Walker, who led the
detail to repair the telegraph line. He wrote:
Over a mile east of the station was a small
creek, which, owing to the shape of its
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FIG. 2. Lt. George M. Walker's 1918 map, illustrating the terrain in the vicinity of Platte Bridge Station. See Map
Note 1.

banks, had to be crossed at fords. The ford
on the telegraph road was hidden from view
of the station by a low mound. East of the
creek was a low ridge a half mile wide, and
beyond lay the valley in which the herd had
been attacked on the previous day. The ford
was considered a danger point, as the Indian
ford of the river was about a half mile north,
and the Indians were congregating on the
north bank. Major Anderson ordered the
infantry Captain to take his men to this
mound and guard the ford until the repair
force returned. He ordered me, in case the
howitzer was fired, to drop all work and
bring my men in at once. The Indian ford
could be seen from the station, but not from
the telegraph line east of the creek. We
found one thousand feet of wire had been
destroyed in the valley near where the herd

had been attacked. I directed one picket to
be sent north along the ridge to watch the
Indian ford, and two, Chappel and Porter, to
the high ground east. 20
Soon after the two parties commenced work on
the ends of the break, the report of the howitzer signaled imminent danger. In the poorly
coordinated retreat, one soldier was killed and
another seriously injured.
Sergeant Custard and the other soldiers at
the wagon train managed to hold out for several hours, but the end was inevitable. Major
Anderson could not send relief. Any detail large
enough to avoid being swallowed by the forces
opposing them would leave the station inadequately defended. In the late afternoon, smoke
was seen rising from the site, indicating that the
wagons had been overrun and set on fire.
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NATIVE AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE

Bent's letters constitute an important record
of the time, his descriptions often providing
the only written account of events from the
Native American viewpoint. He makes little
pretense to objectivity, often underestimating
the casualties suffered by the warriors beside
whom he fought. He rarely mentions events
that enraged the white population, such as
attacks upon civilian settlers and emigrants,
concentrating instead on confrontations with
the military. His descriptions are so disarming
in their simple clarity and economy of words
that, especially in conjunction with the maps,
it is illuminating to read his descriptions verbatim. Many of Bent's letters are written in
an almost stream-of-consciousness manner,
skipping from topic to topic with little regard
for the rules of punctuation. We are thus
fortunate that two of his letters are long and
coherent narrations dealing exclusively with
the events surrounding the attack on Platte
Bridge Station.
The map included with Bent's letter of May
22, 1906, is in poor condition and is difficult
to read (Fig. 3.). Bent drew the map from the
Indians' perspective with the river running
across the top of the page. It has been inverted
to agree in orientation with the remainder of
the maps.
Figure 4 is a rough map drawn by Hyde
and sent to Bent with the request that he use
it to show the locations of the various soldier
societies. The locations for the camp, stockade,
bridge, and the course of the road is drawn by
Hyde, not Bent. Bent returned it with a short
letter dated November 10, 1915. The letter
indicates that Bent had conferred with several
other veterans of the battle. He notes that the
Indians had all wished Collins had gotten farther from the fort before the attack had commenced, and he claims, "There was no signal.
Soon as Big Horn and his party charged from
the river, every band made charge fot Collins'
men." Bent also expresses bewilderment over
Collins's failure to detect the ambush. "I am
always at loss why Collins did not see the heads

of Indians and not to be such foolish to make
the trip up the river.,,21
Figure 5 represents the modern topography
of the region corresponding to that of Figure 3.
The area covered by the box in the lower central
part of Figure 5 corresponds to the area covered
by Figure 4.
Several of Bent's letters describe the raids
he participated in during the months preceding the main offensive. A number of these are
sufficiently detailed that the particular raid can
be recognized in the whites' records. While
the raiding parties came south in late spring,
the main encampment remained well to the
north. Such a concentrated population quickly
exhausted the resources in anyone area, so
they constantly traveled about the river basins
of northern Wyoming, pursuing the bison
herds. Their final encampment before disembarking on the main offensive was on Crazy
Woman's Creek, a tributary of the Powder
River lying about one hundred miles north of
Platte Bridge Station. In contrast to the many
raiding parties that worked independently and
with little coordination, the attack at Platte
Bridge would be a major, carefully planned
offensive. The moon was new on July 22 and
this may have influenced the choice of the
departure date. Upon reaching the Platte, the
new crescent would be visible for only a short
time after sunset, after which the darkness
would help conceal the movements of warriors.
Bent offers a detailed description of the painstaking preparation that preceded the trip. The
group would bring a large number of horses,
each warrior riding a horse and leading his war
pony to ensure a mount fresh for battle. Bent
himself led a sorrel racehorse of which he was
clearly proud; his father had bought it for him
in Denver for 500 dollars.22 About 200 women
accompanied the war party.23
Time was drawing for big war party to
start. Foolish Dogs soldiers were selected
to act as police to see that no war parties
started out. Small war parties were even
not allowed to start out. Foolish Dogs sent
crier right away also ahnouncing if any
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men had to be feasted while doing all this.
They were some time getting to Crazy
Woman's Creek. After being camped here
for several days the chiefs gave it out to get
ready for marching towards Platte Bridge.
It was a great sight. Day before starting it
was announced through the villages for all
the bands of soldiers to get up their war
horses, paint them up same as going into
battle and put on all the war rigs, war bonnets, shields, lances, scalp shirts and all
the medicine charms .... Those that got
ready first rode out to the opening of the
circle of the village Yz mile and waited until
everybody got there. Each band formed in
line. Bravest ones in battle were told to
take lead and behind of these lines, there
were 2 men in each line, 2 men in lead and
4 in rear. Foolish Dogs took lead of all the
bands. Dog Soldiers came last and behind
everybody. Siouxs and Arapahoes took part
also. These bands rode around inside of the
circle of the village. The line must have
been 2 miles long. Everybody was singing
war songs. Women and old men standing
in front of their lodges singing as the bands
rode by in front. At night there was singing all through the village. Next morning,
horses were in center of the village so the
horses could be caught if they were to be
taken along. The first day they did not go
very far so everybody could come up. Each
band of soldiers camped together. Chiefs
of the three tribes went ahead always to
locate the camp. Foolish Dogs acted as
police on this march. Half of them took
the lead and half of them came behind to
see that everybody kept in the line. The
chiefs rode ahead of the Foolish Dogs. The
chiefs would dismount on march whenever
they came to water and stop for little while
for everybody to water their horses and get
water for themselves and also take smoke
with their pipes. 24
Bent does not specify how long the trip took,
but Crazy Head is quite specific on the point:
"They were three nights on the road and
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reached the place the third morning."25 This
would have required the line to move about
thirty miles per day. Bent continued:
Before getting to Platte Bridge the chiefs
selected several warriors to go ahead to
Platte Bridge and find out how many soldiers
were there and to come back and report
what they had seen. These scouts came back
that evening. This big party stopped on
small stream. No timber on it. They told the
chiefs what they had seen. This was given
out through the war camp. Three old men
on horseback one Cheyenne, one Sioux and
one Arapahoe, cried this news out. I think
there were 3,000 Indians in this war party.
These criers also announced no singing
would be allowed by Foolish Dogs. They
were police in charge of the whole party.
Next morning the chiefs selected ten more
warriors to follow the creek they camped on
to mouth as this creek ran just below north
end of Platte Bridge. The Foolish Dog soldiers got on each side of the whole line of
this big war party and the Dog Soldiers got
in rear and bunched up the whole line from
the rear. There was great crowd of warriors,
old men and women. Of course, the chiefs
were in lead in long line. Northern Cheyenne, Southern Cheyenne, Sioux and
Arapahoe chiefs were all in this line. In this
line I seen Red Cloud and Old Man Afraid
of His Horses with their scalp shirts on.
Everybody was told not to go out of walk as
it would make too much dust and the soldiers would see it and would know that big
war party was coming. The chiefs came to
big hill and stopped behind this hill. Those
with spy glasses crawled up this hill to see if
scouts had got to mouth of the creek. Now
all the medicine making commenced.
Everybody was notified to get ready for fight.
War bonnets were taken out of sacks. The
medicine bonnets were held by owners to
south first, then to west, then to north, then
to east. Last held up to sun, then put on.
Medicine shields were held in right hand
and dipped 4 times on ground, then held up
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to sun and were shaken 4 times, then put on
left side as the right hand is used to carry
lance or war club. These warriors were to
draw the soldiers toward this big hill. It was
5 or 6 miles from bridge. They knew if they
could get the soldiers this far out from the
bridge they could kill them all before they
could get back. Everybody began to string
out behind the hill. Only the chiefs were
allowed to look down this valley. Dull Knife,
Northern Cheyenne, said in loud voice that
soldiers were crossing the bridge, coming
this way. It was not long after he said this
that we heard firing. Everybody was now
anxious to see over and made rush to where
chiefs were sitting. The Foolish Dogs soldiers ran back several warriors after firing
small arms. We heard cannon go off. Everybody was now talking in excitement. We
could all see down the valley and see our
scouts and soldiers, cavalry and infantry
were on each side of the cannon. We could
see the smoke from the cannon whenever
they fired it. These warriors seen they could
not draw them away. They left them about
noon and came back. Jules Seminole, half
breed who was at stockade working for government told me that the soldiers and whites
had no idea that big war party was after
them as they had seen small war parties
several times there before. Jules himself
thought just small party was there to run off
the stock. He said Casper [sic] Collins had
orders not to follow any Indians unless they
run off stock. This is why he did not follow
these scouts or warriors. Said river was very
high. Foolish Dogs and Dog Soldiers moved
everybody back on this creek behind big hill
to camp for the night. More scouts were sent
at night to the bridge. My brother Charley
went with this party. They did not return
that night. Just at daylight everybody got
ready for attack. Lot of them followed the
creek down. I joined large party that stood
behind big hills north of the bridge, 2 miles
from the river. The road ran between our
party and the river. Big party went west of
bridge next to the river behind small bluff. I

will mark the lines of Indians on paper so
you will see how Casper Collins and his men
came into the trap. About 9 o'clock we seen
Collins coming across the bridge and took
the road. I always thought he must have seen
some heads of Indians. Everybody was on
horses looking over towards Collins and his
men going up the road. Collins was about
one mile and half from the bridge when
those at river charged at him first. Then
those behind the hill that I was with made
charge on him as he was making back for
the bridge. Company of infantry with
cannon ran across the bridge and fired the
cannon at the Indians as they were closing
in on Collins from all sides. I seen Casper
Collins pass by me with arrow sticking in his
forehead on his grey horse. He fell among
the Indians the last I seen of him. Some
soldiers got away and ran to this infantry.
Indian by name of Slow Bull captured
Collins' horse .... While we were standing
on hills talking about the fight, Indians hollered to us that they were signaling on
horses that whites were in sight up the river.
We all jumped on our horses and rode up the
road in plain view of soldiers at the bridge.
This must have been a grand sight for them
as all the Indians were running up the river
towards the government train that Caspar
Collins was going out to meet that morning
when he was killed. This was about 3 miles
from bridge where train corralled in sand
hills next to the river. When I got there I
looked back down the road. As far as I could
see the Indians were still coming. A lot of
them were already fighting the soldiers. Just
as my party were riding up lot of mules came
running towards us. Indians were behind
them. The soldiers got under the wagons
and used their bedding, sacks of corn and
mess boxes for breast works as they had time
to do all this before the Indians got all
around them. They saw Indians all around
the bridge and where Collins' men were
laying from where they first come up on hill.
They could see plainly to the bridge as it was
level to the bridge. They selected good place
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to fight from. It was kind of basin. This basin
was about 100 yards wide each way as I took
good look at it after the soldiers were all
killed. 22 soldiers were killed in this party.
One driver swam across and got away. This
man shot Roman Nose's brother. Two
Indians swam after him. He only had pistol
buckled around his head when he swam the
river. He hid in brush after he crossed and
Roman Nose's brother ran onto him without
seeing him and he shot him through the
head. Nobody did not know he was killed for
some time as everybody was busy with the
soldiers fighting them. 8 Indians were killed
in this battle. 4 soldiers were in wagons that
done good shooting. All the wagons had
covers on them and these 4 men cut holes in
the sheets to shoot through. So much firing
was going on, the Indians did not know that
they were in wagons for some time. The
Indians were shooting at those under the
wagons. Someone spoke up. Smoke came
from wagons as he seen it plain. He pointed
out the wagon, then the Indians shot at this
wagon several times, lot of them together.
Wolf Tongue, "Twins," Roman Nose in fact
several brave warriors said all to get ready,
that they were going to ride around the
wagons and empty the soldiers' guns, then
those in front to charge up against the
wagons. I stood up and seen these warriors
with their war bonnets and shields on as
they rode around the wagons. At first good
many shots came from under wagons and
only 3 or 4 from wagon, then all the Indians
made war-hoop and charged from all sides.
When I ran down there, it was only 60
yards, they were shooting the soldiers under
the wagons and those in the wagon. 3 of
those had been killed. One soldier they
threw out of the wagon and killed him on
the ground. After this fight we all came back
to where we stayed that night as we had left
our pack ponies and saddles as Indians ride
bare back in all the fights. Next morning
good many war parties started again in different directions. Biggest party started for
home. I was with this party.2 6

15

Unfortunately, Bent reveals little of the
battle plans, if any, the Indians had. In an earlier letter he states, "The river was very high.
The Indians intended to rush across the river
but could not do so on account of the river
being up."27It is possible that they originally
intended to attack the station, at least in part,
from the south side of the river rather than
concentrating on the more easily defended
bridgehead. Bent was depended upon for his
skills in reading and speaking English. The
Indians would often bring him objects of white
manufacture they were unfamiliar with, such
as canned goods, and ask him to explain them.
He would also read written documents they had
found. He was later employed as an interpreter
when the Indians parlayed with the Sawyers
Expedition. However, his insight into white
ways seems not to have been truly exploited by
the chiefs, at least not to the extent of bringing
him into their tactical discussions. His letters
suggest that his role was that of a warrior listening to orders and preparing to execute them.
It is clear that on July 25, the main force of
Indians remained behind the hills five miles up
Casper Creek, apparently hoping that they could
decoy the soldiers out to that area. Early on the
second day, they approached much closer to the
station. Such a large-scale operation probably
began before dawn. A large contingent of warriors managed to conceal itself behind the hill a
mile to the northwest, and others occupied the
ravines west of the fort and along Casper Creek.
The previous day, they had gotten the soldiers
to fan out over the bottomland and along the
creek, but they hadn't come far enough to fall
into the Indians' ambush. It is possible that the
Indians brought their forces into the immediate vicinity of the fort preparatory to another
attempt at decoying the soldiers over the bridge,
this time into a closer ambush. They did not
attempt to entirely conceal their presence. One
witness states that on the morning of the 26th,
As soon as we could distinguish objects, we
scanned the surrounding country to see if
we could find any of our last evening's opponents. We did not make out any on our side
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of the river, but on the north side there were
some moving about and others squatted on
the hills. Altogether there seemed to be
about ninety in sight, just about the number
we had been fighting the day before. 28

have the effect of breaking up the whole
party, as each tribe declared they would not
coalesce with the other in the future, and
in fact were just about ready to turn their
weapons against each other.'o

The much greater force remained concealed.
When the attack on Collins commenced, the
body that rushed the bridge from Casper Creek
was estimated at five hundred. 29 0f course, the
Indians had no way of knowing that Collins
would come over the bridge that morning
and lead two dozen men between two of their
forces, those behind the hill and those along
the river. Whatever their plans were, the unexpected arrival of the Collins detail forced the
Indians to act, revealing the true magnitude of
the force and derailing any plans that required
the element of surprise.
The unexpected events of the morning, or
possibly the difficulty of coordinating a large
and diverse group, led to internal disruption.
One of the "friend lies" living on the station
grounds took the quite courageous step of
eavesdropping on the enemy:

It is clear from Bent's narration that the chiefs
were actively guiding the operation. They, as
well as the warriors, were obviously familiar
with the tactics used in raiding, but they had
little experience in organizing such a large
group, the equivalent of two regiments, into
an effective fighting force. The resulting chaos
was costly.
Bent's statement that only eight warriors
were killed at the wagon train is likely not true.
When the soldiers ventured out to the site a few
days later to bury the dead, they counted the
tracks of some forty travois used to carry off the
dead and wounded. Furthermore, though the
Indians scalped all the dead soldiers, they abandoned the scalps, which were found lying about
the site. This was interpreted as an indication
that they had suffered an unacceptable number
of casualties and thus could not exult in the
victory.31Many casualties were also sustained in
the course of the Collins battle. The casualties
suffered by the Native Americans were always
difficult to estimate owing to their tradition
of removing all their fallen comrades from the
field of battle, even at great risk to themselves.
However, it was later indicated that Indian
runners in the vicinity of Fort Halleck reported
that the war party had suffered 200 dead and
wounded. 32
This, then, may explain the extraordinary
events of the morning following the battle. As
one witness describes the scene:

[Wj e heard a good deal of loud talking among
the Indians who were gathered together in a
large body on the bluff, about three-fourths
of a mile from us. They seemed very much
excited and we expected they were making
arrangements to make another charge on
the bridge, and we prepared ourselves for
the onset. ... At this time a half-breed
Snake Indian, who lived in a "Tepee" or
tent between the station and the bridge, and
who had crawled up to the bluff to find out
what tribes were there, their numbers, etc.,
returned and reported that the Sioux and
the Cheyennes were having a big quarrel
among themselves, the Cheyennes charging
the Sioux with being great cowards for not
taking the bridge when they attempted it,
and the Sioux retaliating on the Cheyennes
by charging them with shooting a great
many of their warriors when they fired down
the hill at Lieutenant Collins' retreating
party. The half-breed stated that it might

At daybreak, hundreds of the enemy were
seen standing on the north side of the river,
but appear more quiet and passionless.
Standing about in groups, a few came down
to the shore, making great lamentations, and
appeared to be mourning. Several squaws
called out to some Indian women at the
station that "heap Indians killed yesterdaymany braves"; also that they would kill all the
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soldiers today. The number in view increased,
until the forces of yesterday appeared to be
all purposely shown to us in a grand parade.
Thus they stood until about 11 a.m. when
slowly and reluctantly they moved off in
small squads, till all were gone. On the distant hills their pickets and rear guard could
be seen till late in the afternoon. 33
Later that day, reinforcements arrived from
Deer Creek Station. On July 29, a burial detail
ventured out to the site of the wagon train
fight. The soldiers dug a trench and buried
their comrades. The grave was never marked
and was soon absorbed into the landscape. Its
location remains unknown but is currently the
object of research as development in the area
threatens to destroy the site.
July 26 had been a terrible day for the men
of the Kansas Eleventh, but it could have been
much worse. Had the river been lower, allowing
a large number of warriors and horses to cross,
the station would have been vulnerable to a
massive attack from the southeast. It is difficult
to speculate on the course the war would have
taken had the station fallen. Such an event
would certainly have inspired the war party,
and other Native Americans in the region, to
employ the same tactic against other stations
along the North Platte, and they too may have
been confronted by overwhelming forces. As it
was, the soldiers had exacted too great a price
for the operation to continue.
Thus ended the offensive of July 1865.
Though bold in design and breathtaking in
magnitude, the operation failed to adapt to
unanticipated aspects of the battlefield. The
grand war party broke up, and raiding parties
headed in different directions to continue
the war on a scale with which they were more
experienced. George Bent returned to the
Cheyenne encampment.
CONNOR EXPEDITION

It was a few days later that Connor's line
finally pulled out of Fort Laramie. The events of
July 26 may have given his mission new impetus,
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but he was still ill prepared: "I start with scant
supply and barefooted horses."34 The previous
months had been a confusion of changing plans,
failed supply deliveries, and claims of illegal
appropriations of supplies on Connor's part.
Properly outfitting the cavalry was a particular
problem. The time to catch the Indians before
their horses were healthy was long passed. It was
the army's horses that were now inadequate in
number and poor in health. Corn meant to be
stockpiled for the expedition was used as fast as
it arrived. Mules were scarcely able to carry their
saddles. Connor requested six portable forges,
5,000 horseshoes, and a commensurate supply
of nails. He needed mowing machines. The
horses purchased in Canada and sent to him
were utterly worthless. "Rascally" contractors
were letting them down and holding things up.
On July 15, Connor writes to Dodge that he has
heard nothing of the Indians to the north he is
about to engage, but "I wish they had contractor Buckley under their scalping knives."35 With
the end of the Civil War, it was assumed that
manpower would be plentiful, but the soldiers
were all eager to get home and often became
mutinous when placed under orders to head west
for yet another war. Even the most fundamental
stance of the expedition was a point of contention. On August 11, when Connor was ten days
out, Maj. Gen. John Pope wired Dodge:
I have just received copies of instructions
from General Connor to the commanders
of his expedition, in which I find the following words: "You will not receive overtures
of peace or submission from Indians, but
will attack and kill every male Indian over
twelve years of age." These instructions are
atrocious, and are in direct violation of my
repeated orders. You will please take immediate steps to countermand such orders. If
any such orders as General Connor's are carried out it will be disgraceful to the government, and will cost him his commission, if
not worse. Have it rectified without delay.36
Sand Creek was casting its shadow. The public
reaction to the massacre had been one of
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widespread horror and disgust. A senate investigation had reached conclusions quite critical
of the officers and men of the
Army. Pope
was not about to watch those events replayed.
The final form the expedition took was
a three-pronged advance into what is now
northeast Wyoming and southeast Montana.
It was an abject failure. The western prong, led
by Connor, saw the most success. He started
out from Fort Laramie with 400 soldiers, 145
Pawnee scouts, and 200 teamsters running a
train of some 185 wagons. By August 12 he
was constructing a small fort on the headwaters of the Powder River, which he named,
with characteristic modesty, Fort Connor.
The name was later changed to Fort Reno.
Numerous small battles erupted with groups
of Indians returning to the region from postPlatte Bridge raiding. The Pawnee scouts were
particularly adept at luring them into traps.
(Bent's stepmother, Island, was killed in one of
these fights.) Connor then proceeded down the
Powder River and crossed over to the Tongue
River on August 26. Moving down the Tongue,
he located and attacked a village of Arapahoe
on August 29, destroying some 250 lodges and
their contents. Turning back, he reached Fort
Connor on September 24 and was back at Fort
Laramie by October 4.
The eastern prong had left Omaha on July 3.
It was led by Col. Nelson Cole and consisted of
sixteen companies, totaling about 1,400 men,
and a wagon train of 140 six-mule wagons.
On August 14 they passed Bear Butte, some
twelve miles northeast of present-day Sturgis,
South Dakota. At this point, grass, water, and
game became scarce. A few days later they
were encamped on a tributary of the Cheyenne
when they met a party from the central prong
of the expedition.
These men had left Fort Laramie on August
5 under the command of Col. Samuel Walker.
Leading some 600 men and thirteen wagons,
Walker had moved almost straight north. He
was in trouble within six days, finding little
grass and only brackish water. By the time they
reached the base of the Black Hills, Walker's
horses were subsisting on cottonwood bark.

u.s.

Scouts were continually sent out and returned
to report that there was no grass to be found.
Picking up Cole's trail, they learned that his
situation was no better than theirs, and though
they had planned to join forces at this point,
they traveled separately to maximize use of
what sparse resources they found. The horses
began to fail, which at least provided the men
with meat. Even minor streams and ravines
required the wagons to be unloaded, moved
across, and reloaded. Cole estimated that he
lost at least 20 percent of his provisions while
repeatedly performing this task. Attempts to
rendezvous with Connor, as planned, met with
repeated failure. At this point, the Indians
began to strike and there was little they could
do but attempt to defend themselves. The campaign, organized to "punish" the recalcitrant
Natives and secure safe passage to the Montana
gold fields, was in shambles. On the night of
September 9, a storm blew in snow, sleet, and
freezing temperatures. Four hundred and fourteen of Cole's horses dropped dead. He burned
the wagons and provisions that could no longer
be hauled and began the long walk out of the
Powder River Basin, the Indians constantly
harassing h(s rear guard. On September 20,
Cole and Walker straggled into Fort Connor
leading shoeless, gaunt, and starving men.
Despite this, Cole's report claimed they had
swept the area clean of the Native Americans,
killing or wounding an estimated 200 to 500 of
them. Hyde must have mentioned this claim to
Bent, whose terse reply was, "He did not kill no
200 Sioux.,,37
With the escalation of violence experienced in 1864, both sides were anticipating
a definitive confrontation in 1865. However,
neither the punch nor counterpunch actually
connected. The Native Americans brought an
overwhelming force to bear upon a military
objective, but they were tactically out of their
element, attempting warfare on a scale well
beyond their traditional experience or ability
to effectively manage. Likewise, the U.S. Army
was out of its element when it attempted to
take a style of warfare dependent upon centralized industrial production and supply lines into
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a wilderness, one that was also the enemy's
home and stronghold. The rough terrain and
unforgiving environment provided as great a
challenge as did the enemy.
George Bent witnessed the entire ordeal.
With his unique combination of assets-a
Cheyenne upbringing, a white man's education,
and ties of friendship and sympathy stretching
across the gulf that separated the two cultures
through tragic times-he was able to provide
priceless insight.
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MAP NOTES

1. Walker notes that the survey lines and
streams are from U.S. survey plats and other
topography is rendered principally from memory.
His legend reads as follows: (A) Indians attacked
the herd on July 25. (B) Each of three bands of
Indians seen from the roof of the station in the
early morning of July 26. (C) Fight on the morning
of July 26 in which Lt. Caspar Collins was killed.
(D) Body of Lieutenant Collins found. (E) Break
in the telegraph line, which Lieutenant Walker and
his detail attempted to repair. (F) Sergeant Custard
and members of wagon train were killed. (G) Men
who escaped from the train were met by men from
the station. (Walker's placement of the wagon train
fight, F, is incorrect. This position would put it well
to the west of intervening terrain. W, inserted by
the author, marks the most likely position for the
wagon train fight.) This map must be turned about
20 degrees clockwise to comport in orientation with
the maps that follow.
2. This map is entirely in Bent's hand. Originally drawn from the Native American perspective
with the river across the top of the page, the map
is inverted here to comport in orientation with the
maps that follow. Bent's notes read: "This is the way
the Indians stood around when Casper [sic] came
across to be killed," "Camp night before the battle,"
"Where High Back Wolf was killed," "Where
Roman Nose's brother was killed," "Collins killed
here," and "Where 22 soldiers killed." In addition,
he indicates the locations of the Platte River, the

bridge, the stockade, the creek and in several places,
the locations of the soldiers and lines of Indians.
The "line of Indians" along Casper Creek in Fig. 3
comports well with Walker's description.
3. Bent marked the map and returned it with
a short letter dated November 10, 1915. Hyde
indicated a long string of bluffs as the high ground
rather than the single large hill featured in Figs. 2
and 5. Bent indicate s the locations of the Crooked
Lances (the band to which he belonged), the Bow
Strings, the Foxes, and near Casper Creek, the
Chiefs. He locates the Dog Soldiers along the river
west of the bridge and at the mouth of Casper Creek,
corresponding to Walker's observations. The path
taken by Collins was drawn by Hyde and appears
to indicate the point where the Collins party left
the road to mount a ridge. Bent places an "X" where
Collins was attacked. Below that, he writes "this
band made 1st charge," indicating the Dog Soldiers
concealed along the bank of the river. This is reiterated by the memo written across the bottom of
the page: "Note: D. Soldiers were closer to Collins
than other bands." Hyde's notes state: "The broken
lines and arrow-points indicate the direction of the
Indian charge." Hyde does not indicate what "A"
and "B" stand for, nor is there any indication of their
meaning in Bent's accompanying letter. The actual
location of the camp was farther up the creek than
is indicated on this map.
4. Bent's map suggests that warriors were concealed not only behind the hill northwest of the
station but also in a line all the way east to Casper
Creek. Modern construction has destroyed the
original terrain, but note that Walker's map shows a
tributary of Casper Creek running through this area
that would correspond to such a position. Bent's
map also shows that a line of warriors reached from
the hill northwest of the bridge down to the river.
Ravines in the area would have provided adequate
cover for such a line. The most likely position of
the wagon train fight, is indicated in the lower
left corner. The rectangle overlaying the lower
central portion of this map corresponds to the area
shown in Fig. 4, http://seamless.usgs.gov/index.php
(accessed January 2010).

